Closing remarks from No Way Home? An event organised by Erasmus University Rotterdam on European asylum and return policies on Friday, March 13th, 2026 in Rotterdam.
Arjen Leerkes, Professor of Migration, Security and Social Cohesion, Department of Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus University Rotterdam
I would like to end this event with a short reflection. Not only about the effectiveness and legitimacy of European asylum and return policies. But also about the legitimacy of the liberal state in general and the European Union in particular.
Let me start with something that happened a few weeks ago. I was invited to speak on a programme called TRT Roundtable. We discussed European plans for stricter return policies. Including proposals for so-called return hubs outside the European Union.
As you may know, the European Commission plans to allow deportation of rejected asylum seekers and other irregular migrants to third countries they have no ties with. Earlier this week, a coalition between Christian conservatives and the radical right greenlighted the proposal, which brings such “hubs” a step closer.
After the broadcast I looked at the reactions online. One comment had by far the most likes. It said:
“NOT GOOD ENOUGH.
Deport.
Stop all benefits.
Charge all criminals.
Remove inept politicians.”
Now, this comment may sound harsh. But it expresses something real. Many Europeans feel that governments have lost control of migration. And they want governments to restore that control.
At the same time, many Europeans also believe something else. They believe that people fleeing war and persecution deserve protection, and that there should be legal opportunities for migrants to work in Europe if there are vacancies that cannot be filled by Europeans.
These views exist side by side in European societies – and elsewhere. And that is why migration policy is always a balancing act.
A balancing act between control and protection. Between sovereignty and human rights. Between economic growth and perceived threat. Between political pressure and legal constraints.
But the difficulty of that balancing act has increased in recent years. Migration has become one of the most polarizing political issues in Europe.
In many countries, radical-right parties have gained support with very strong anti-migration narratives, especially anti-asylum and anti “illegal migration” narratives. And this has changed the political climate.
Even governments that strongly support refugee protection increasingly feel pressure to demonstrate that they are tough on “unwanted” migration.
As a result, European migration policy has gradually moved towards deterrence. We see this in many areas. Stronger border controls and pushbacks at sea. More efforts to externalize migration management. And increasingly stricter return policies.
Earlier this week, the European Parliament approved a new return regulation. Among other things, it allows for longer periods of detention, no longer gives rejected asylum seekers the right to organize their own departure before they risk being detained and deported, and expands the possibility of deporting migrants to third countries with which they have no ties and will be in a very precarious position – the so-called return hubs.
At the same time, another major reform is about to take effect. In June, the EU Migration Pact will enter into force. One of its key elements is the new border procedure.
Under this procedure, asylum seekers from countries with recognition rates below roughly twenty percent may be held in controlled facilities at the EU’s external borders for up to twelve weeks while their claims are processed in accelerated procedures.
The idea behind these policies is clear. To send a signal. To demonstrate control. And to deter irregular migration.
But today we asked different questions. Not whether these policies are currently politically attractive. But how they impact the global human rights regime in Europe – traditionally an important pillar of that regime – and whether policies of deterrence will work.
Because effective migration policy is not only about tough language and the use of physical force. It is also about cooperation. Cooperation from migrants. Cooperation from countries of origin. And cooperation between European states.
And cooperation depends on legitimacy. Rules are stronger when people believe in them.
And that legitimacy operates at several levels.
First, policies must be seen as legitimate by citizens. If they believe migration policies are unfair or ineffective, trust in government erodes.
Second, policies must be seen as legitimate by migrants themselves. Because return policies often depend on their cooperation.
And third, policies must be seen as legitimate by countries of origin and transit. Without their cooperation, returns are often impossible.
If legitimacy breaks down at any of these levels, policy becomes difficult to enforce. And this is exactly where research becomes important.
Let me briefly mention two research projects that were discussed today.
The FAiR project examines the effectiveness and legitimacy of European return policies. The project will run until November 2026. We hope its findings will continue to influence the field in several ways: through a handbook for policymakers with concrete recommendations, through a negotiation game we are developing for professionals and students to simulate intergovernmental negotiations about return, and through a special issue of scientific articles based on the project.
In the project, we studied, among other things, how cooperation between European countries and countries of origin actually works. One important insight is that cooperation cannot rely only on pressure.
Countries of origin are more willing to cooperate when return policies are perceived as fair, proportionate, when they prioritize relatively voluntary forms of return over deportation, and when countries do not feel they merely function as a “dumping ground”.
Seen in this light, it is remarkable that these countries had only limited involvement when the new migration rules were created and discussed.
The second project is LEGASY. This project looks at the perspectives of migrants themselves, in this case: asylum seekers.
Through surveys and interviews with more than a thousand residents of Dutch reception centres, the project examines how asylum seekers perceive the asylum procedure.
Do they see it as fair? Do they feel treated with respect? Do they see authorities as legitimate?
The findings are striking. When asylum seekers perceive the asylum system as fair, they not only report higher levels of well-being and stronger identification with the Netherlands; they are also more likely to accept return decisions as legitimate and to trust organizations like the DT&V.
One of our hopes is that this survey will eventually become a permanent instrument in the Dutch – and perhaps European – migration governance field. If only to give voice to, and receive feedback from, a large group of people who have no right to vote, but are nonetheless part of our societies.
In other words: even in migration control, legitimacy matters. Because people do not respond only to force. They also respond to fairness.
This insight may seem obvious. But it is often missing from political debates.
Much of the current discussion about asylum seekers and “irregular migration” focuses almost entirely on deterrence. How can we make migration less attractive? How can we increase the costs of irregular stay? How can we signal that Europe is not an easy destination?
But deterrence alone has limits. Asylum migration flows are primarily driven by factors such as war, political instability and transnational networks. It is therefore likely that deterrent policies will reduce the number of new arrivals only to some extent.
And return policies depend heavily on cooperation. Return hubs may change some aspects of return policy, but they will not eliminate the EU’s dependence on cooperation with countries of origin. Without such cooperation, many return decisions will remain difficult to implement.
Deterrence may produce headlines. Legitimacy produces cooperation.
The Migration Pact itself also depends heavily on political cooperation within the European Union. The system assumes that countries at the EU’s external borders will organise reception and asylum procedures, while other member states contribute through relocation or financial support.
But it remains uncertain how much solidarity border countries will receive, and there is no clear solidarity mechanism for organizing the return of the arrivals whose asylum applications are rejected.
If cooperation within the EU proves limited, countries of first arrival may end up carrying a disproportionate share of both reception and return. If countries of first arrival come to believe that European cooperation is unfair, tensions between member states may increase rather than decrease.
And if the pact fails to produce the promised control over migration, political frustration may quickly grow.
Which brings us to a broader risk.
When politics promises more control than policy can realistically deliver, disappointment becomes inevitable. Europe thus risks falling into what I would like to call an expectation trap.
An expectation trap occurs when citizens come to expect outcomes that governments simply cannot deliver.
If, in a few years, political leaders conclude that Europe still has “no control” over migration, the pressure for even more radical policies will increase. Some voices may even argue that the right to asylum itself should be abolished.
But here we encounter an important reality. The right to asylum is deeply embedded in European and international law. Changing that framework would require fundamental legal and political transformations that could take many years — if they are possible at all.
In the meantime, courts, policymakers and international institutions may be blamed for the failure of policies that were never fully feasible in the first place.
A dangerous dynamic in which frustration with migration policy begins to undermine trust in democratic institutions themselves. Europe risks falling on the very sword that it so eagerly brandishes to its citizens.
So what should we do?
I believe Europe essentially faces two options.
The first option is to accept that migration governance will always involve limits. States can control migration to a certain extent. But not completely.
Fair and effective return policies must combine physical force with more voluntary mechanisms of cooperation — and must accept that not all irregular migrants can be returned. And states must seek cooperation with migrants and countries of origin.
Research projects such as FAiR and LEGASY can help identify where that balance lies. They show that effectiveness and a broad approach to legitimacy are not opposites. In fact, they often reinforce each other.
It is the responsibility of policymakers to explain these complexities to their constituents.
The second option is to seriously explore alternative ways of organizing refugee protection and low-skilled work. For example, systems of refugee protection that rely more strongly, or even exclusively, on international cooperation and resettlement, and community-based sponsorship.
Some scholars argue that asylum systems could gradually move towards models where refugees should primarily receive protection in regions close to conflict areas – even more than today – combined with structured resettlement programmes from there to other countries farther away.
Such proposals raise many important questions. Would refugees accept such systems? Would countries in the region cooperate? What would this mean for international law? How would smuggling networks respond?
At the moment, we do not yet have clear answers to these questions. And that is exactly why research is also badly needed in this direction in the coming years.
Let me conclude with something very different.
Last year, millions of Europeans watched the Eurovision Song Contest. The Dutch entry was Claude – a singer who came to the Netherlands as a child refugee from Congo.
While watching the reactions online, I saw a comment that stayed with me. It said:
“He came here as a refugee – and now he represents our country. That’s something to be proud of.”
That sentence captures something important.
Migration is often discussed in terms of fear. In terms of control. In terms of numbers.
But migration is also about people. About lives that unfold in unexpected ways. And about societies that are strong enough to combine order with openness, rules with fairness, and control with humanity.
Most of these lives are far less visible than the life of a singer.
But over the years I have met several students in Rotterdam who had been undocumented in the Netherlands during part of their lives and are now working as doctors, lawyers and policy advisors. I know that some of them are with us today.
Migration policy will always be difficult. But one lesson from research remains clear.
Migration policies work best when people believe they are fair — citizens and non-citizens, professionals and migrants.
Thank you.